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Abstract
The draft 2017 Cybersecurity Curricula, also
called CSEC2017, is being developed to provide
guidelines for cybersecurity curricula development.
One component, the Knowledge Areas, includes
Knowledge Units. This terminology is the same as is
used for the U.S. NSA/DHS Centers of Academic
Excellence in various disciplines of cybersecurity. The
two are different, yet complementary. In order to aid
faculty and others in understanding the difference
between the two programs, this paper explores both the
CSEC2017 and CAE academic designation criteria,
and compares and contrasts them.

1. Introduction
Two major academic projects are working on
academic curriculum issues associated with
cybersecurity curricula. There has been confusion
about the objectives of each of these projects and the
role they play in assisting educators to create
appropriate cybersecurity curricula. The first of these
projects is the Cybersecurity Curricula 2017
Curriculum Guidelines for Post-Secondary Degree
Programs in Cybersecurity (CSEC2017), a curricular
guidance effort for the broad field of cybersecurity.
The second is the Center of Academic Excellence
Knowledge Unit program for the CAE CDE program
(KU), a community driven effort to create a list of
prescriptive educational elements describing a
cybersecurity program in an educational setting.
Cybersecurity is a broad set of disciplines, with a
body of knowledge that spans multiple distinct
educational areas and is intertwined with virtually
every aspect of our information age. What began as a
computer science and computer engineering discipline
has spread into a wide range of disciplines. Today,
there is a need for cybersecurity-educated professionals
in a wide range of jobs [11]. Educational institutions
have responded with cybersecurity education programs
in a wide array of disciplines beyond the original
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computer science and engineering disciplines.
Business,
information
systems,
information
technology, law, political science, psychology, and
interdisciplinary efforts including mathematics and
physics have joined into the disciplines that have
graduates entering the workforce as cybersecurity
workers. This has created a need to define what
belongs in a cybersecurity curriculum and how to
assess curricular efforts with respect to producing
employment ready students.
There is a known shortage of cybersecurity
professionals, both in the government and the private
sector [3, 6]. The shortage has been raised to national
importance by both the current and previous US
administrations, each time calling for greater
workforce development in cybersecurity [15, 16].
Cybersecurity education has a number of challenges in
meeting the workforce needs. [5] Many of these issues
have existed for years. Continual efforts by the US
government in the form of the NIST-led National
Initiative on Cybersecurity Education (NIST NICE)
[12, 14] and the NSA/DHS effort with Centers of
Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense Education
(CAE-CD) [4, 10] have made a dent in the problem,
but for academia to fid and shift resources into
developing and implementing new curricula takes time
and resources. Aligning academia educational output
and industry needs in a changing environment has been
a challenge for decades and in cybersecurity this has
been noted for at least 20 years [1]. A recent
academically led effort, CSEC2017, to develop
curricular guidance in cybersecurity education has
created what may be the missing piece for academics
to properly advance academic programs to meet the
needs of graduates and industry. [8]
The previously mentioned initiatives from the
government, the CAE and NICE programs, initially
were targeted to meet specific hiring needs of the
federal government. This led to problems with
academics adopting them directly for classroom use, as
they were far from curricula guidance and targeted
specific training as opposed to education [2]. Both of
these programs have undergone updates in the past
couple of years. This paper examines the knowledge
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unit development process of the NSA/DHS CAE-CD
program, comparing and contrasting it with the
CSEC2017 effort.
The ACM, IEEE Computer Society, AIS SIGSEC,
and IFIP WG 11.8 started the CSEC2017 Joint Task
Force on Cybersecurity Education (JTF) in 2015. Its
goal is to “develop comprehensive curricular guidance
in cybersecurity education that will support future
program development and associated educational
efforts at the post-secondary level” ([8], p. 8). The
guidance document, called CSEC2017, presents
important areas of knowledge in the field of
cybersecurity as well as a framework providing
structure [8]. The framework provides guidance for
curriculum developers to determine which areas of
knowledge are most critical for their discipline or
professional competence. They can then emphasize
those aspects in greater depth than the other knowledge
areas while ensuring they cover the knowledge areas
applicable to their goals.

2. CSEC2017
The term “cybersecurity professional” is
ambiguous [9]. While it designates a worker in the
field of cybersecurity, the skills and knowledge that
such a professional is expected to have varies wildly
among jobs. One who sets security policy need not
understand precisely how the technology works, or the
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman theorem of the undecidability
of security, but that person should know the limits of
what the technology can do and what is feasible to
require of both people and systems. A security
administrator need not understand the laws and
regulations that underlie the security policies the
system is to enforce, but she must understand how the
technology works and how to install and configure it to
enforce those policies (or say what cannot be
enforced). A cybersecurity professor needs to know the
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman theorem as well as the
principles underlying cybersecurity and their
application in technology. Thus, the term
“cybersecurity profession” is generic and not specific –
really, it should be “cybersecurity professions”.

A cybersecurity professional typically completes a
curriculum to obtain a degree or certification, and then
practices her work for some period of time. This raises
the issue of what an appropriate cybersecurity
curriculum should cover. Given the wide range of jobs
that cybersecurity professionals undertake, no single
curriculum can serve all needs. Yet there are certain
underlying themes common to all cybersecurity
professions that any cybersecurity curriculum must
cover. The depth, time spent, and knowledge, skills,
and abilities in these themes depend upon the goals of
the particular curriculum.
The CSEC2017’s goals speak to this need. It is to
provide curricular guidance that is comprehensive
enough to support a wide range of disciplines and
competencies. This guidance is to be grounded in the
basic principles of cybersecurity, yet be flexible
enough to accommodate educational programs with
differing needs, and enable them to evolve as the field
of cybersecurity, and the needs of the workforce, also
evolve.
In order to achieve this goal, the JTF is composed
of cybersecurity experts from academia, industry, and
government. They work in both technical and nontechnical disciplines. In addition to international
representation on the JTF, a Global Advisory Board
provides input to make the guidelines useful to nonUnited States institutions and programs. Working
groups include educators and practitioners from all
over the world who have experience in the particular
knowledge areas on which they are working.
The structure of the CSEC2017 model consists of
four parts:





Knowledge areas;
Crosscutting concepts;
Disciplinary lenses; and
Application areas.

2.1. Knowledge Areas
Knowledge areas (KAs) organize the knowledge of
cybersecurity. Figure 1 shows their structure.
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Figure 1. The structure of the knowledge areas. The same topic may appear under different
knowledge units; this simply gives a different emphasis for the topic.

The JTF has identified eight such areas:
1. The data security KA covers the protection of
data both when stationary and during
transmission.
2. The software security KA covers the
development,
deployment,
operation,
maintenance, and decommissioning of
software in such a way that desired security
and robustness properties are maintained
throughout the software life cycle.
3. The component security KA deals with the
security of components and their manufacture
and fabrication, including the supply chain
and interfaces.
4. The connection security KA deals with the
connection of components; this includes the
physical media used in transmission, network
services, and network security.
5. The system security KA deals with the
security of the system as a whole, such as the
composition of components, authentication,
system architectures, and the security of
specialized systems such as embedded and
autonomous systems and the Internet of
Things.
6. The human security KA looks at protecting
the data, and through that the privacy, of
people.
7. The organizational security KA focuses on
the protection of organizations from threats
that impede their accomplishing their mission.
8. The societal security KA treats cybersecurity
aspects that affect society at large, such as
cyberlaw and cybercrime, ethics, professional
and social responsibility, and intellectual
property.
These knowledge areas are not mutually exclusive.
A knowledge unit may sit in more than one KA, in

which case the KA it is in drives the way one looks at
the unit. For example, a knowledge unit on
cryptography certainly falls into the data security KA
because it is central to the protection of data. It also
falls into the system security KA because cryptography
is used to authenticate components of a system (for
example, by using and validating digital signatures).
Finally, the use of cryptography has societal
implications—witness the debate about whether “back
doors” should be embedded in products—and for this
aspect would fall under the societal security KA.
Each knowledge unit groups topics of a single
theme together. These knowledge units in turn are
made up of topics, each of which has an associated set
of learning outcomes. Topics may fall under multiple
knowledge units, and learning objectives may also fall
under multiple topics.

2.2. Cross-Cutting Concepts
The cross-cutting concepts connect the knowledge
areas. They emphasize key concepts common to all
aspects of cybersecurity. The model has five such
concepts.
1. Confidentiality rules limit access to data and
resources.
2. Integrity rules aim to provide assurance that
data and resources are trustworthy.
3. Availability rules ensure that access to data or
resources
meet
quality
of
service
requirements.
4. Risk deals with threats from the environment
and from adversaries.
5. Adversarial thinking considers how an
adversary might hinder or thwart obtaining
the desired result.
For example, consider confidentiality. It is clearly a
key component of the data security, connection
security, system security, and organizational security
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KAs. It is a component of the human security KA in
the guise of privacy, among other things. And it affects
societal security through a combination of the above,
so would also be in the societal security KA. Finally,
its importance to the software security KA lies in the
protection of sensitive data such as passwords, and
indeed the use of obfuscation to protect the software
itself.

2.3. Disciplinary Lenses
The disciplinary lenses provide the approach, depth,
and learning outcomes for each knowledge unit that are
appropriate for a particular discipline. For example,
consider an enterprise architecture. A non-technical
discipline (such as pre-law) would examine the effect
and consequences of legislation involving computer
technology. That discipline would require an
understanding of what technology can, and cannot, do
to inform how the laws should be written and what the
effects of the laws would be (or are). It would not
require a detailed knowledge of how the components
making up the technology in question work. An
information systems student would emphasize how the
security policies derived from (among other things)
legislation and regulations affects the protection of
data. Thus, she would need to know details of the
configuration and management of the technology, but
not the effects or consequences of specific legislation.
Finally, a computer science major would need to know
how the components of the system work, with
management and legal issues being weighted much less
heavily than in the pre-law program.
The disciplines in the model are based on those
identified by the ACM:
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

The computer science discipline covers the
development of software, ways to use
computers to solve problems, and new ways
to use computers.
The computer engineering discipline looks at
designing and implementing computing
devices.
The information systems discipline explores
the uses of information processing technology
in enterprises, with an emphasis on the use of
information on those systems.
The information technology discipline is
similar to that of information systems, but
focuses on the technology rather than the use
of information on that technology.
The software engineering discipline deals
with defining, developing, implementing,
testing, maintaining software

6.

Finally, the other disciplinary majors includes
other disciplines, with elements chosen from
the above disciplines as appropriate.

2.4. Application Areas
Application areas link cybersecurity curricular
elements to professional practice. They filter the
knowledge, skills, and abilities gleaned through
appropriate disciplinary lenses to frameworks used in
professional societies and the workforce. Specifically,
they define the breadth and depth of coverage expected
for each core idea in the particular profession or job.
The seven application areas are:
1. Public policy covers managers such as
executive management, legislators, regulators,
and other public and private personnel who
develop or affect cybersecurity policy.
2. Procurement covers those who purchase or
otherwise acquire information technology,
and hire the people who will work with it.
They must understand the cybersecurity
considerations involved in such procurement
and hiring, including risk management and
assurance with respect to the mission of the
systems and people.
3. Management refers to those who administer
the systems and the environment necessary to
support the systems, users, and administrators.
Cybersecurity considerations include business
continuity matters, managing identity and
authorization, and incident handling.
4. Software development involves ensuring the
software meets requirements, including those
aimed at compliance with policy, laws, and
regulations, and that it is robust. This includes
testing the software as well as maintaining it
and developing patches and updates as
needed.
5. IT security operations focuses on the
operation of the systems in such a way that
they meet cybersecurity requirements.
Practitioners must be able to translate policy
into operational procedures, and be able to
configure systems and networks to this end.
6. Enterprise architecture refers to the
aggregation of all technology in the
enterprise, as well as their operation and
management. It covers elements from the
above five application areas.
7. Finally, research in cybersecurity requires an
understanding of access control and the three
general properties, namely confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Beyond these, the
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specific topic(s) of research dictate what else
a researcher should know, and in what depth.
A researcher in network security needs to
know how networks are used in practice to
determine how best to design an intrusion
detection system to gather data for analysis,
but does not need to know the proof of the
Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman theorem. However, a
researcher in the foundations of computer
security needs to know both the theorem and
its proof, but not how networks are used in
practice.
These application areas are preliminary, and may
change as the CSEC2017 undergoes refinement.

2.5. Summary
It is critical to understand that CSEC2017 is not a
curriculum. For example, in the topic “cryptography”,
the CSEC2017 does not say which algorithms should
be taught. This is because the state of the art changes.
In the 1970s, the Data Encryption Standard was
considered state of the art; in the 2000s, it clearly is
not. So it is left to the curriculum designers to
instantiate the topics that they believe should be
covered, and determine what exactly should be taught
to satisfy the needs of their specific curriculum.
The contents of the CSEC2017 are being validated
through comparison with existing bodies of knowledge
and curricula. For example, the Fundamental Principles
knowledge unit in the Software Security KA has been
compared to numerous software vulnerabilities lists,
including the OWASP Top Ten Most Critical Web
Application Security Risks and the IEEE Cyber
Security document Avoiding the Top 10 Software
Security Design Flaws [7, 13]. As the practice and
documentation knowledge units are fleshed out, they
will again be compared to these (and other) documents,
as well as various course syllabi involving secure
software development. Other KAs will proceed
similarly.
The CSEC2017 is a work in progress. Undoubtedly
it will change before being finalized. For example, the
systems security KA is likely to be split into two or
more knowledge areas because its scope is so large, or
the scope may be narrowed. The JTF is actively
discussing both possibilities.1
Even when finalized, the CSEC2017 will need to be
updated as cybersecurity education, and cybersecurity
1
Indeed, the original system security KA has been split into the
component security, connection security, and system security KAs
shown above between the writing of the submitted version and final
version of this paper.

professions, evolve. This is expected, and the intent is
to provide a sound basis both for curricular
development and the evolution of the guidelines.

3. CAE KU Project
In 1997, the U.S. National Security Agency
designated 7 schools in the United States as Centers of
Academic Excellence in Information Assurance
Education (CAE-IAE). Other schools were designated
in successive years, and soon the criteria for such
designation was that the academic program had to meet
criteria defined by U.S. national training standards
CNSS 4011 and at least additional such standard.
Academic institutions pushed back against this
criteria, pointing out the difference between training
and academic education — both are appropriate, but
the four-year institutions focus on the latter rather than
the former [2]. In part because of this, the National
Security Agency and the Department of Homeland
Security (which had joined to co-lead the CAE
program) began to focus on what should be in a
curriculum in order to educate a cybersecurity worker.
In 2014, the criteria for designation was revised
radically, around the educational elements associated
with cybersecurity. These curricular components, the
Knowledge Units, covered specific topics to be taught
by institutions using the KUs. Being designated a
CAE-CD (the new name for what was a CAE-IAE)
now required the institution to cover the material in a
set of basic KUs and selected optional KUs that
described their academic program content. In addition,
two-year academic institutions such as Community
Colleges could now also be designated CAE-2Y,
indicating they also satisfied a set of KUs. How the
institution taught the specific topics was up to the
institution — but all the material in a KU had to be
covered.
Although this initial set of KUs was developed as a
result of a series of information gathering meetings
where academics provided input into the content of the
KUs, many academic institutions felt the KUs were
inadequate. In 2016 the U.S. National Science
Foundation funded a project to create a social
community and wiki to update the KUs.
The result of this KU refinement has been a
broadening of the information describing a knowledge
unit. What began as a name, a description, and a list of
topics and outcomes, has been expanded to include
many additional elements such as a vocabulary, a
connection to the NIST NICE Job Tasks, and
connection to industry certifications. On the current
schedule, the next set of KUs will be submitted to the
program office at NSA in the fall of 2017 for use in
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2018, although the program will continue to refine and
develop the KUs for future releases.
The objective of the KU project is simple: to
provide a set of prescriptive elements that can be used
to assess a program with respect to academic content
elements. The way this works begins with each
institution defining what their educational outcome
objectives are with respect to their cybersecurity
program. With the field being so broad, programs need
to specialize in some aspect of the discipline, and from
there define the curriculum that will produce graduates
aligned with these objectives. The Centers of
Academic Excellence program allows programs to
define their academic program in the form of a series
of core (mandatory) knowledge units, supported by a
larger set of elective KUs to shape the curriculum
objectives to the school’s objectives. Assessors can
then assess the mapping of the school’s academic work
to the chosen set of KUs to determine whether a
program is satisfactorily comprehensive on the
academic side. There are additional programmatic
elements, and the program office will consider the
package as a whole to determine whether the
institution’s cybersecurity program meets the standards
of a Center of Academic Excellence.
The key to the assessment of the academic program
comes from the comprehensiveness of the KUs, and
this content is in the hands of academics. As
academics improve the comprehensive nature of the
KUs through the refinement project, they will more
closely represent the actual needs of an organization
with respect to content that has both an education
component and a workforce development and training
component, making program assessment easier, and
more meaningful.

4. Contrasting the CSEC2017 and CAE
KU Projects
Both CSEC2017 and the CAE KU project have
knowledge units, and this has caused many in the
academic community to question how these projects
differ and ask which they should back.
Indeed, both projects have Knowledge Units, and
over time, these two knowledge bases are expected to
converge. They are being developed by different
groups at the present time, and while the groups, and
the goals of the groups, are different, both efforts are
open to public input and cross pollination is and will
continue to occur. But this is really a minor aspect and
ignores the bigger question. How are they different
and what does that mean to a faculty member?
CSEC2017 is an effort to develop comprehensive
curricular guidance in cybersecurity education that will

support future program development. Again, it is not a
curriculum document, but the basis for developing
curriculum documents. Those documents will draw
upon the contents of CSEC2017, the specific
requirements of the academic institution or group
developing the curriculum, and sources within the
industries and organizations that hire current graduates
of the program. As the curricular guidance contains the
necessary information for any and all curricula in the
cybersecurity disciplines, it is up to the curriculum
developers to select the topics, decide upon an
instantiation of those topics, the way those topics are to
be covered, and in what depth they should be covered,
for a specific program. In this way, the curriculum
developer can create a curriculum that is both
academically sound and that gives graduates the
practical aspects they need to succeed.
The CAE KU project has an entirely different
focus. Its goal is to provide a basis for recommending
programs as meeting the needs of educating
cybersecurity workers. Like CSEC2017, it recognizes
the need for flexibility, in that no single program meets
the needs of all cybersecurity professionals. So it
provides a set of KUs, topics, and outcomes that
schools can map their programs into (and, if necessary,
add material from) to demonstrate they are meeting the
criteria for a CAE. No program would use all of the
KU’s, or even more than a small fraction for that
matter. In other words, what has to happen is that the
program pick from the set of KUs the appropriate ones
to describe their program.
The first step is to decide what your cybersecurity
program attempts to accomplish. From there, the
CSEC2017 effort will help you develop a sound
comprehensive curriculum, and the CAE KU effort
provides a means to describe the program to the CAE
office. What is most important in the near term is that
both the CSEC2017 and CAE KU efforts will be
ongoing and need academic input to properly refine
them towards their objectives.

5. Future Efforts
Both the CSEC2017 and CAE KU effort will be
ongoing as future revisions of both projects will further
clarify and refine the outputs of the two efforts. And
over time, the KU portion of both projects may in fact
become aligned, but that is several revisions in the
future. And all of this effort is occurring in the rapidly
changing environment of cybersecurity. The US
government has produced the National Initiative for
Cybersecurity Education National Cybersecurity
Workforce Framework (NCWF), a third generation
attempt at documenting the workforce needs in
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cybersecurity in a notional framework. Over time, this
effort too, will have to shift and move as the field of
cybersecurity advances. In the interim, there is a need
for all three elements, the Center of Academic
Excellence program, the CSEC2017 initiative and the
NCWF, for each comes at different problems, from
different angles and provides crucial information to
further define and develop the needed academic
programs to address a workforce shortage.
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